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Managerial Compensation in
Midwestern Cooperatives:
Results from a Follow-up Study
Robert P. King, David D. Trechter, and David Cobia
Results are presented from a follow-up survey of managerial compensation prac-
tices in local farm supply and marketing cooperatives in Minnesota, North Dakota, and
Wisconsin. In contrast to findings from the original survey, total compensation levels,
bonuses, and changes in compensation are all found to be positively and significantly
associated with local net margin and not closely related to sales and sales growth.
Recruiting, motivating, and retaining effective managers are some of the most impor-
tant and difficult challenges facing agricultural cooperative boards. Managerial perfor-
mance can be critical to the success of a cooperative enterprise. A managerial incentive
systemis one ofthe most influential tools boards have for signaling cooperative objectives
and rewarding progress toward meeting them. However, restrictions onforms ofcompen-
sation that grant ownership inthe cooperative and the complexityofmappingcooperative
goals into clear-cut performance targets greatly complicate the tasks of evaluating manag-
ers and setting their compensation levels.
In the 1995 issue of this journal, Trechter and King reported findings from a 1993
survey of managerial compensation practices in Minnesota and Wisconsin cooperatives
for the 1992 fiscal year. Results from that study indicated that overall compensation and
bonuses received by general managers oflocal cooperatives were more closely associated
with size measures than with levels of profitability The results also suggested that there
was not a strong relationship between compensation practices and cooperative perfor-
mance, measured by return on assets.
Afollow-up compensationsurveywas conductedinthe spring of 1994to collect com-
pensation data for the 1993 fiscal year. The study population was expanded to include
local cooperatives inNorth Dakota, alongwith the Minnesota andWisconsin cooperatives
that responded to the first survey questionnaire. in addition, new questions were added
to the surveyto elicit information onthe use ofspecific cooperative performance targets in
settings where there were no explicit incentive clauses in the manager's contract. Finally,
collecting compensation data for a second consecutive year made it possible to analyze
factors associated with changes incompensationlevels. While the importance ofstudying
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changes in compensation was recognized in 1962 by McGuire, Chiu, and Elbing (p. 761),
most studies ofmanagerial compensation in agribusiness firms (e.g., Akridge, Whipker, and
Erickson 1989) and small andmediumsized businesses (e.g., Storey, Watson, andWynarczyk
1995) have focused on compensation levels in a single year.
Results from this follow-up survey are reported here. In the sections that follow, data
collection procedures are first briefly summarized. Then findings regarding compensation
levels and changes in compensation performance are presented, and relationships between
compensation practices and cooperative performance are briefly discussed.
Data Collection
Data collection procedures for this studywere essentially the same as those for the initial
survey, as described in greater detail byTrechter and King (1997,50-51). Mail surveyques-
tionnaires completed by both the cooperative manager and the board chair were the source
of data on cooperative characteristics, compensation practices, and compensation levels.
These data were supplemented with financial data for each cooperative from the financial
statement database maintained by the St. Paul Bank for Cooperatives.
Questionnaires were mailed to the 120 Minnesota and Wisconsin cooperatives that re-
turned both questionnaires in the first survey Ofthese, 75 returned complete responses to
both questionnaires in the follow-up survey Questionnaires were mailed to 159 coopera-
tives in North Dakota. Of these, 22 returned complete responses to both questionnaires.
Overall, then, the response rate for this surveywas 35%, identical to that in the first survey
The questionnaire sent to managers ofNorth Dakota cooperatives differed slightly from that
sent to managers in the other two states. Information on compensation levels for both the
current year and the previous year was requested from the North Dakota managers, since
compensation data were not collected from them in the initial survey Of the 97 coopera-
tives that returned complete responses to bothquestionnaires, four cooperativeswere elimi-
nated from the analysis because of inconsistent information on benefits, and one coopera-
tive was eliminated because it sustained catastrophic losses in 1992. Therefore, there were
92 cooperatives in the final sample.
Summaryinformation for the cooperatives included in this studyis presented intable 1.
The size groupings for Farm Supply and Marketing cooperatives are the same as those used
in reporting results from the initial survey (Trechter and King 1997, 52). Figures in table 1




Table I. Selected Characteristics of Ninety-two Surveyed Cooperatives in Minnesota, North Dakota,andWisconsin
III .,
E
Characteristic Farm Supply Marketing ()
Small Medium Large Small Medium Luge
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Members 916 1,217 3,660 266 638 900
:::l
3:
Employees 11 23 58 5 9 26 c:
Lines of Business 57 80 86 4.5 4.9 4.3 ~
III
III
Total Sales '93 3,299,207 7,285,435 16,282,597 7,319,231 13,337,619 31,249,060 ....
III .,
Total Assets '92 1,919,495 7,364,476 7,677,536 2,493,924 5,049,408 11,116,281 :::l
Local Net Margin '93 69,031 170,053 253,320 121,602 113,620 396,619
()
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<' % with College Degree 30 57 67 11 17 14 III
III
Years Managerial Exp. 11 13 14 16 18 18
Compensation Levels '92
Salary 36,539 47,830 62,600 41,372 43,833 61,361
Bonus 1,514 3,088 2,153 2,511 5,550 3,471
Benefits 4,200 5,481 7,683 5,393 3,917 6,908
Total Compensation 42,253 56,399 72,436 49,276 53,300 71,740
Compeusatiou Levels '93
Salary 37,816 46,752 65,675 41,306 46,783 63,753
Bonus 1,884 3,748 2,175 2,861 6,883 5,714
Benefits 4,469 5,688 6,800 4,892 4,775 6,654
Total Compensation 44,169 53,188 74,640 49,059 58,441 76,121
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Levels of Compensation
One ofthe primaryobjectives ofthe initial survey was to identify relationships between
cooperative andmanager characteristicsand the level ofcompensation received by the man-
ager. Parameters ofthe following model were estimated:
(1) TCOMPI+1= bo+ b1LNMI + b2TA + b3SALES I + b4In(MANEXI) + bsDEGREEI
+ b6In(NLINEJ + UI
where TCOMP is total compensation (the sum of salary, bonuses, commissions, and ben-
efits), LNM is local net margin, TA is total assets, SALES is total sales, MANEX is years of
managementexperience, DEGREE is abinaryvariable equal to one ifthe manager has a four-
year college or graduate degree, NLlNE is the number of lines ofbusiness for the coopera-
tive, bo to b6 are parameters to be estimated, and u is a stochastic error term. The use of
natural logarithms for MANEX and NLlNE reflects an assumption that increases in the level
ofcompensation associated withanaddedyear ofexperience orline ofbusiness diminish as
these variables increase. The cooperative andmanagercharacteristics onthe right-handside
of the model are for year t, while compensation is for year t+1. Therefore, this model allows
a board to use known factors to establish an "expected" compensation level for the coming
year.
For the original specification ofequation 1, the error term was found to have non-con-
stantvariance. To correct for heteroskedasticity, the parameters ofthe modelwere estimated
by weighted least squares regression, using total cooperative assets (TA) as the weighting
factor.
Based on data collected inthe original survey, Trechterand King (1995, 58-59) reported
positive signs for all parameter estimates, as expected, and the model explained 75% of
observed variation in compensation levels. The parameter estimates for LNM and NLlNE
were not statistically significant at the 0,05 level ofsignificance, however. These results for
compensationlevels in 1992 suggested that managerial compensationwas notcloselylinked
to profitability or to the complexity of the manager's task.
Parameters for this same model were estimated by weighted least squares regression,
using 1993 compensation data from the follow-up survey In the follOwing results, numbers
in parentheses are t statistics.
(2) TCOMPI+1= 19402 + 0.031364LNMI + 0.0022036TAI + 0.00065492SALESI +
(6.527) (2462) (1.745) (1433)




Once again, all parameterestimates have positive signs, as expected. Parameters for local net
margin, the four-year degree binary variable, the log ofthe number oflines ofbusiness, and
the constant term are all significantly different from zero at the 0.02 level. Parameters for
total assets and the log of managerial experience are significantly different from zero at the
0.10 level. Only the parameter for total sales is not Significantly different from zero at the
0.15 level. In contrast to results for 1992 from the original study, these results suggest that
compensation was closely related to profitability and to the complexity of the manager's
task. Differences in parameterestimatesandsignificancelevels for the two years may be due
to statistical factors, such as multicollinearity, and it is not possible to determine whether
one set of parameter estimates more closely reflects common practices. It is clear, however,Managerial Compensation in Midwestern Cooperatives 39
that the 1993 results are more consistent with recommendations based on economic theory
and accepted business practices.
Bonuses are an important part of the compensation package for many local cooperative
managers. They are a tool boards can use to reward outstanding overall performance or
specific accomplishments inmore narrowly defined areas that are critical to the short- and
long-term success of the cooperative. In the initial survey, 47% of the managers who re-
sponded received a bonus as part of their 1992 compensation package. Only 7% of the
respondents indicated that pre-determined incentive clauses were used to determine their
bonuses. In the follow-up survey, 54 ofthemanagers responding (57%) received bonuses in
1993, and 22 ofthe respondents (25%) indicated that theirbonuses were based on specific
incentive clauses.
In the analysis of data collected in the initial survey, Trechter and King (1985, 59-60)
found no statistically significant relationship between profitability, as measured by local net
margin, and the bonus received by the manager. They did report weak but statistically
significant relationships betweenbonuses and two size measures: total assets and total sales.
The following Tobit regression modelwas specified to investigate relationships between bo-
nuses and cooperative performance levels reported in the follow-up survey.
o
(3) BONUS,+, = min {
ICLAUSE,[boTA, +blLNM, +b2DSALE, +b3DLNW,1
+(l-ICLAUSE,)[b4TA +bsLNM, +b6DSALE, +b7DLNW,1 +u,
where BONUS is the bonus received in 1993, ICLAUSE is a binary variable equal to 1 if the
manager's bonus was based on a specific incentive clause formula, TA and LNM are total
assets and local net margin in the fiscal year that endedjust prior to the bonus payment,
DSALE and DLNW are changes in sales and local net worth in the fiscal year ending just
prior to the bonus payment, bothrough b7 are parameters to be estimated, and u is a sto-
chastic error term. Prior year financial performance measures are used as explanatory vari-
ables because they reflect the information available to the board at the time abonusis deter-
mined. Once again, the errortermhadnon-constantvariance and observationswere weighted
by total assets to correct for heteroskedasticity. This specification allows for differences
between cooperatives that use incentive clauses and those that do not.]
When the full model was estimated, onlyb, b4, and b6 were significantly different from
zero at even the 0.30 level of significance, based on the likelihood ratio test suggested by
Tobin (1958, 29). Therefore, the model was restricted to include only these parameters.
The estimation results, with chi-square p-values in parentheses, are:
o
(4) BONUS,+] = min {
ICLAUSE,[0.018372LNM,1
(0026)
+ (ICLAUSE, -1)[-0.000543TA +0.026485DSALE,1
(OlOO) (0000)
Squared correlation between observed and expected values = 0.2350
For managers with incentive clauses, the predicted bonus is slightly less than 2 percent of
local net margin. For managers without incentive clauses, the predicted bonus is slightly
more than 2.5 percent of sales growth exceeding a threshold level related to the size of
the cooperative's total assets. In contrast to the results for 1992, then, these results suggest
that bonuses are related to profitability in cooperatives that use incentive clauses. In40 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
cooperatives that do not use incentive clauses, the manager's bonus is most closely associ-
ated with growth in sales volume. From an economic perspective, the performance mea-
sures associated with bonuses in cooperatives that use incentive clauses appear to be more
appropriate than those in cooperatives that do not use incentive clauses.
Changes in Compensation
A manager's total compensation reflects the history of compensation decisions made by
the board duringthe manager's tenure. Ahighlevel ofcompensation maybe due to superior
performance in the past, rather than in the present. Therefore, changes in compensation
may provide more useful insights into the factors boards emphasize when evaluating a
manager's current performance. The follow-up surveymade it possible to estimate relation-
ships between changes in compensation andvarious measures ofcooperative performance.
Total compensation for amanageris comprised ofa salary, whichcanbe viewed as abase
component of compensation that would decline only in very unusual circumstances; bo-
nuses and commissions, which are nota permanent part ofthe compensation package; and
benefits, whichgenerally reflect compensationpolicies that applyto all employees.2 Changes
in the first two ofthese components-salaryandbonus-are the primaryinstrumentsboards
use to signal theirassessment ofthe manager's performance. Changes insalary, because they
are essentially permanent, are most likely to be used to reward permanent improvements in
the cooperatives position andare less likely to reflect transitorychanges. Onthe otherhand,
bonuses can be more reflective of short-term changes in performance. In this analysis, we
consider absolute and percentage changes in salary (DSAL and PDSAL, respectively) and
absolute and percentage changes in the sum ofsalary and benefits (DSB and PDSB, respec-
tively)3 Benefits were not included in this analysis for two reasons. First, as noted above,
changes in benefits may reflect cooperative policies that apply equally to all employees or
changes in costs for employee insurance coverage. Second, there were inconsistencies in
benefit data from the two surveys that were difficult to reconcile. We believe some ofthese
inconsistencies were due to difficulties in actually calculating the value ofbenefits.
Measuring cooperative performance is difficult, since the ultimate benefits from a coop-
erative should be reflected in the financial position and performance ofits members. In this
analysis, the explanatoryvariables included absolute and percentage changes in three com-
monly used performance measures: local net margin (DLNM and PDLNM, respectively for
absolute and percentage changes), sales (DSALES and PDSALES, respectively), and local net
worth (DLNW and PDLN\V, respectively). Several measures of current profitability were
also considered, including local net margin (LNM), return on assets (ROA), and relative
return on assets (RELROA), which was defined as the ratio of the cooperative's ROA to the
average ROA for cooperatives ofsimilartype
4 None ofthese variables added to the explana-
tory power of the model, however, and they were ultimately excluded from the analysis.
Finally, the percentage change in ameasure ofoperatingefficiency-theratio ofgross margin
plus sales from services to total operating expenses-was also considered in the analysis of
percentage changes in compensation. This variable was named PDOE. 5
Absolute changes in salary and salary and bonuses for 1993 were regressed on DLNM,
DSALES, and DLNW for 1992, with each observation weighted by total assets to correct for
heteroskedasticity. The regression results follow, with t-statistics for parameter estimates in
parentheses.
(5) DSALt+1 = 643.99 + 0.0069214DLNMt - 0000068120DSALESt + 0005329DLNWt
(2.869) (2.251) (-0.2525) (2.567)
Adjusted R2 = 0.1222Managerial Compensation in Midwestern Cooperatives
(6) DSBt+1 = 697.48 + 0.0089817DLNMt + 0.00040129DSALESt + 0.0070483DLNWt
(2.273) (2.137) (1.088) 0.388)
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Adjusted R2 = 0.0974
Itis noteworthy that change in local net margin has a positive coefficient that is significantly
different from zero at the 0.05 level inbothmodels and that change in sales does nothave a
statistically significant coefficient in either model. Change in local net worth, perhaps the
bestmeasure oflonger term performance, has astatisticallysignificant, positive coefficient in
the salary modelbutis notstatistically different from zero at even the 0.151evelin the salary
and bonus model. This is consistent with the hypothesis that changes in salary are used to
reward permanent changes in the cooperative's financial position.
Percentage changes in salary andsalaryand bonuses for 1993 were regressed onPDLNM,
PDSALES, PDLN\N, and PDOE for 1992. The regression results follow, with t-statistics for
parameter estimates in parentheses.
(7) PDSALt+1 = 0.027517 + 0.0062147PDLNMt + 0.098292PDSALESt
(3.190) (3.209) (2.844)
- 0.0098469PDLNWt + 0.13957PDOEt
(-0.1565) (2.819)
Adjusted R2 = 0.2138
(8) PDSBt+1 = 0.028311 + 0.0064581PDLNMt + 0.18318PDSALESt
(2.524) (2.565) (4.076)
- 0.066666PDLNWt + 0.1091OPDOEt
(-0.8150) 0.695)
Adjusted R2 = 0.2060
Percentage change in local net margin has a positive, highly significant coefficient in both
models. In contrast to the results for absolute changes in compensation, percentage change
in sales has a positive, statistically significant coefficient in both ofthese models, while per-
centage change inlocal networth does not have a statisticallysignificant coefficient ineither
model. Itis noteworthythat the coefficient ofPDSALES is muchlarger inthe second model,
indicating that changes inbonuses are more strongly influenced by growth insales than are
changes insalary. Finally, percentage change in operatingefficiency has positive coefficients
that are statistically different from zero at the 0.10 level in both models. The effects of
improvements inoperating efficiency are stronger, however, in the model that only includes
changes in salary in the dependent variable. This suggests that changes in operating effi-
ciency may be viewed by boards as more permanent changes.
In summary, these regression results present a somewhat mixed picture of the financial
performance factors that help predict changes in compensation levels. In all four models,
increasesinlocal netmarginare associated withincreases insalaryandthe sumofsalaryand
bonus. On the other hand, it is much more difficult to sort out the influence of changes in
sales and local net worth on changes in compensation. The change in sales and the change
in local net worth measures are highly correlated in the data set. We are not able to deter-
mine whether statistical problems or actual differences in behavior lead to these differences
in results.42 Journal of Cooperatives 1998
Relationships between Compensation Practices and Return on Assets
Results from the original survey indicated that there was only aweak statistical relation-
ship between compensation practices and cooperative performance, measured by return on
assets. This relationship was even weaker for data from the follow-up survey, with less than
5% ofthe variation in return on assets explained by the model. Therefore, statistical results
from this segment of the analysis are not presented here. We believe the poor explanatory
power of a wide range of statistical models may be due to the fact that many cooperatives
performed poorly in 1993 because ofwidespread flooding.
Concluding Remarks
The results from this follow-up study onmanagerial compensation inlocal cooperatives
provide additional evidence on relationships between cooperative performance and mana-
gerial compensation. In general, they suggest a stronger relationship between the general
manager's compensation andcooperative profitability and operatingefficiency thanwas found
in the initial study It is not possible to determine definitively whether these findings or
those from the first survey more truly reflect current compensation patterns in these coop-
eratives. We do believe, however, that the patterns and relationships reported here are more
consistent with compensation practices that can be sustained in the long run and will en-
courage managerial actions that are in the best interests of cooperative members.
Results from the analysis ofchanges in compensationadd anewperspective to the litera-
ture on managerial compensation in cooperatives. They point to a strong link between
changes in local net margin and changes in compensation. They also suggest that more
permanent changes in local net worth and operating efficiency have a stronger effect on
salary, while more transitorychanges insales tend to be rewarded throughchanges in bonus
levels.
To supplement this study, Trechter, King, Cobia, and Hartell (1997) conducted five case
studies designed to collect more detailed information on compensation practices in coop-
eratives with outstanding performance. One of two key findings from these case studies
helps explain survey findings and regression results regarding bonuses. Board chairs from
four of the five case cooperativeswere hesitant to use specific ex ante incentive clauses as the
basis for setting bonuses, largely because they believed focusing on a narrow set of perfor-
mance measures could lead to unexpected, undesirable results. From the perspective of
most of the managers, internal motivation and pride in their work were as important as
"high powered" incentives in encouraging strong performance. The second key finding
from the case studies provides insights on whyit is difficult to draw statistical inferences on
compensation procedures from survey data. Awide range ofapproaches can be effective for
communicating goals and proViding incentives to achieve them. The proper approach and
mix ofincentives is influenced by the length ofthe manager's tenure, the nature ofthe coop-
erative, and the relationship between the board and the manager.Managerial Compensation in Midwestern Cooperatives 43
Notes
1. The (1 -ICLAUSE) tennin this modelwas mistakenlywrittenas (ICLAUSE -1) inTrechter
and King (1995,59-60).
2. Commissions were rarely used by the cooperatives in the study When present, they are
treated as bonuses.
3. Since bonus levels can be zero, it is not possible to analyze percentage changes in bo-
nuses.
4. See Antle and Smith (1986) for an investigation of the importance of relative perfor-
mance in determining compensation for corporate executives. More recently, Meyer and
Vickers (1997) have presented theoretical results that suggest the use of relative perfor-
mance measures may not be optimal in a dynamic setting.
5. The absolute change in operating efficiency was not included in the absolute change
model for two reasons. First, its coefficient is difficult to interpret ina model where all other
variables are measured in dollar tenns. Second, it is highly correlated with absolute change
in local net worth and so introduces serious multicollinearity problems into the model.
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